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Abstract 
The 1966 World Cup Finals are remembered primarily for on-field events, not least the host’s 
capture of the Jules Rimet trophy, the performances of the minnows of North Korea in 
reaching the quarter-finals and the Eusebio inspired exploits of the tournament’s other 
debutants, Portugal. What is less prominent in this history but more significant in impacting 
the longer-term trajectory of the World Cup and the global game, are events off the field of 
play, specifically the decision of African nations to boycott the qualifying rounds of the 
tournament. This paper assesses the circumstances behind this boycott, both within FIFA and 
in the highly charged political climate that characterized the immediate post-colonial era. 
Particular attention is paid to the role of Ghana as the boycott’s chief architect. Thereafter, I 
explore some of the intended and unintended consequences of the boycott, including its 
contribution to an ongoing transformation in the global governance of football. 
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Introduction 
In the context of FIFA World Cup history, 1966 is remembered primarily for events on the 
field of play, not least the host’s capture of the Jules Rimet trophy, the performances of the 
minnow’s of North Korea in reaching the quarter-finals and the Eusebio-inspired exploits of 
the tournament’s other debutants from Portugal. What is less prominent in this history but I 
would argue more significant in impacting the longer-term trajectory of the World Cup and 
the global game more generally, are events off the field of play, specifically the decision of 
African nations to boycott the qualifying rounds for the 1966 tournament in protest against 
what was considered by the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) as an ‘outrageously 
unfair’ distribution of places for the World Cup Finals.1 Drawing on official minutes, 
personal correspondence from key protagonists and newspaper reportage mined over a fifteen 
year period from archives in Cairo, Accra, Zurich, New York and the UK, this study 
examines the circumstances that gave rise to this boycott and explores some of its key 
consequences, intended and unintended. 
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The article begins by briefly accounting for the significance of three interrelated 
processes that underpinned Africa’s emerging role in the world game in the late colonial and 
early post-colonial period and that fed into the boycott. The first relates to the growing 
politicisation of African football and its role as a locus for anti-colonial, embryonic 
nationalist sentiment. The second was African football’s collective response to a deeply 
infused and long-standing Eurocentrism within the Fédération International de Football 
Association (FIFA). Finally, and the one that most directly underscored the boycott, was the 
aspiration of newly independent African nations to use the world game, and in particular, the 
World Cup, as a vehicle for registering their presence and acquiring recognition on the 
international stage. Given that these processes were particularly pervasive in Ghana and that 
much of the impetus for the boycott strategy came from this country, specific attention is 
accorded to its role as the chief architect. More specifically, the article unpacks how the 
rationale behind the boycott reflected the pan-African vision of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s 
first President. In doing so, this paper reveals how football, and the boycott articulated with  
wider political currents of the time. Thereafter, attention shifts to exploring some of the 
intended and unintended consequences of the boycott, including how it contributed to an 
unparalleled transformation in the global governance of football.  
 
Football, Eurocentrism and resistance in the late colonial and early post-colonial period 
Prior to the independence movements that swept the African continent in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, FIFA operated primarily in the interests of the game’s established European and 
South American constituencies.2 In this context, Africa was considered largely as an 
irrelevance, not least because with Ethiopia’s affiliation to FIFA in 1953 the number of 
African members within FIFA totalled just four. While the inception of CAF in 1957 created 
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a platform on which to push for the more internationalist agenda that FIFA claimed was at the 
heart of its mission,3 the Africanisation of the game and its growing status as a site for anti-
colonial sentiment and the articulation of nascent nationalism in the post-war period was 
equally as important in the decision to employ a highly politicised boycott strategy to protest 
against FIFA’s European bias. It is not necessary here to detail the role of the game in this 
regard, except to say that there is a small, but important historiography on the political 
pedigree of football in colonial Africa, specifically in North Africa, the Belgian Congo, 
Tanzania, Zanzibar, Ghana, Nigeria and Algeria.4 In his survey of the relationship between 
football, nationhood and the movement for independence in late colonial Africa, Ossie Stuart 
summarised the central argument of this historiography by pointing to the fact that the game 
became ‘an embodiment of the political aspirations of the African people’ and was used 
across the continent as an ‘expression of defiance towards the state and of independence from 
their colonial oppressors’.5 
Football’s role as a conduit for fledgling senses of nationhood and growing anti-
colonial mobilisation infused the game with a collectivist and at times, radical political 
pedigree. This rendered it a utilitarian vehicle both for post-independence nation building and 
for pursuing recognition in the post-colonial world. While football in this period continued to 
nourish more parochial ethnic identities in Africa,6 the establishment of national leagues and 
investment in national teams were identified as important in mobilising youth around a 
common sense of national identity. However, the strategic use of the game by newly 
independent nations to register and project their presence on the international stage was 
predicated on access to and opportunities in international football. While FIFA’s statutes did 
not prevent these countries from affiliating to the world body, a deeply entrenched 
Eurocentrism, one that became more prevalent with the expansion in FIFA’s constituency 
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list, constrained African nations’ pursuit of the visibility and recognition that they felt the 
world game should offer.  
Despite being small in number prior to the late 1950s, FIFA’s African membership 
had articulated a desire for better representation in the game’s corridors of power and they 
were eager to establish a confederation to oversee the development of the game across the 
continent. However, their ambitions were initially frustrated by condescending and 
patronising attitudes on the part of FIFA’s European leadership.7 Nonetheless, the initiation 
of CAF in 1956 and its formal ratification by FIFA the following year, provided a potent dais 
upon which to respond to this bias.8 At the same time that they joined the continental body, 
football federations from newly independent African states applied for affiliation to the world 
body. However, FIFA membership meant little unless it was combined with meaningful 
participation and for an ambitious and expanding African constituency, this meant 
opportunities to play in the game’s most prestigious international competition.   
By the early 1960s FIFA’s African membership, then numbering more than 20 
national associations, began to seek ways of ensuring that the international game’s 
institutional and competition structures developed in ways that accommodated their needs 
and aspirations. Given that FIFA’s electoral franchise at Congress operated on the principle 
of one nation one vote, it might have been expected that CAF would be in a position to 
challenge the power imbalances that lay at the heart of the International Federation. However, 
European administrators, anxious to maintain hegemony within FIFA, had organised 
themselves into a politically unified confederation in 1954 and they resolved to consolidate 
their position within FIFA whilst at the same time marginalizing Africa and Asia.9 For 
example, in 1956 Gustav Weiderkehr, later to become President of UEFA, warned of the 
‘danger’ of FIFA’s European members finding themselves as an electoral minority unable to 
veto alterations to FIFA’s statutes.10 In these circumstances, UEFA made several attempts 
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during the late 1950s and early 1960s to introduce a pluralist voting system that would more 
adequately reflect their self-perceived standing in world football.11 
The failure of these efforts persuaded them to seek to maintain their hegemony in 
other ways. Chief amongst these was a strategy aimed at ensuring that the format of the 
World Cup Finals continued to protect European interests at the expense of FIFA’s newer 
members. The World Cup had up until that point reflected Europe’s and South America’s 
longer standing international pedigree. For example at the three World Cups between 1954 
and 1962, all but two of the sixteen qualifying berths went to teams from these confederations 
with Europe securing 12 places for 1954 and 1958 and 10 for the 1962 tournament. Despite 
growing calls for a more representative competition, one that provided meaningful 
opportunities for the game’s emerging members to qualify for, FIFA remained intransigent. 
Neither Africa nor Asia were granted an automatic qualifying berth and in the early 1960s 
UEFA’s Executive Committee considered, albeit later abandoned, the idea of pushing for a 
reduction in the number of participants in the Finals as a method of consolidating its position 
and limiting opportunities for the developing world.12 This exclusion was institutionalised in 
the early 1960s, when as part of qualification for the 1962 tournament in Chile, the world 
body stipulated that the winners of the African preliminary round (Morocco) would be 
required to play a further qualifying match against a European team (Spain).13 FIFA’s refusal 
to grant Africa its own World Cup berth was formalised in 1964 when the world body 
introduced a rule requiring the winners of the African zone to play the winners of the 
Asia/Oceania zone to qualify for future World Cup Finals. This decision was the final 
provocation and ultimately instigated a more radical approach from Africa, one that was in 




Football, Nationalism and Pan-Africanism in Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana 
The idea of a continent wide boycott of the qualifying rounds of the 1966 World Cup was 
initiated and orchestrated by the leading Ghanaian nationalist and ardent pan-Africanist 
Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah’s political apprenticeship was embedded in pan-Africanism, a 
political and intellectual movement that he would go on to lead. While it had roots stretching 
back to the mid-nineteenth century in the United States, W.E.B. Du Bois was the father of 
modern pan-Africanism and his promotion of African history and culture inspired subsequent 
African-American and West Indian intellectuals and activists, including Marcus Garvey, 
C.L.R. James and George Padmore whose writings and activism did much to build a strong 
sense of black African consciousness. All were hugely influential in the development of the 
pan-African Congress movement and the four congresses held between 1900 and 1927 were 
important in solidifying pan-African ideals into a formal political movement, one that 
advocated the liberation of African peoples across the diaspora and on the African continent. 
By the mid-1940s African leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta and Léopold Senghor had become 
more influential in promoting the pan-African agenda and when the fifth pan-African 
Congress was convened in Manchester in 1945, Nkrumah, who had moved to London earlier 
that year to study, was introduced to the increasingly formalised and co-ordinated movement 
for African liberation.14  
Nkrumah’s route to the forefront of this movement was swift and his contribution to 
the development of the ideology that underpinned it immeasurable. Shortly before he was 
invited back to Ghana to begin his journey in the Ghanaian political scene and to push for 
independence, he had joined a group of fellow committed students in The Circle which was 
comprised of only the most ardent supporters of Pan-Africanism.15 On his return to Ghana in 
1947 to take up the position as general secretary of the pro-independence, nationalist political 
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party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), what he had learned from Du Bois, 
Padmore and other pan-African intellectuals and from his experiences at the Manchester 
Congress and as a member of The Circle, were woven into his campaign for Ghanaian 
independence. Once this had been secured, he championed African liberation and unity as the 
bedrock upon which African interests on the world stage could be best promoted and 
protected. His convening of a number of conferences in 1958 to build support for and 
promote these aspirations, and his leading role in the establishment of the Organisation of 
African Unity in 1963 were evidence of his commitment to pan-African ideals.16      
In light of his leading role in pan-Africanism, it is hardly surprising that Nkrumah was 
a central figure in the politicised response to FIFA’s allocation of places for the World Cup. 
Following his return to Ghana, he was quickly persuaded of the value of football as a tool to 
build popular support for his nationalist and Pan-African aspirations, particularly among 
young, urban working class men. A keen observer of nationalist currents elsewhere on the 
continent, Nkrumah could not have failed but to have recognised the politicisation and 
Africanisation of the game in the late colonial period. In neighbouring Nigeria, Nkrumah was 
well aware of the use of football by Nnamdi Azikiwe, his fellow African nationalist and later 
first president of Nigeria, as a vehicle to challenge British colonial rule and embed the notion 
of an independent Nigeria in the public consciousness.17 While the local game in Ghana 
reflected and at times reinforced what he described as the ‘emerging evil’ of regional self-
interest, Nkrumah quickly identified in football, a resource that could help to build populist 
approval for the political agenda of his Convention People’s Party (CPP) and generate 
support for his political campaign for independence and his unitarist vision for Ghana.18 
As independence neared, he positioned himself more closely to the game and when it 
became clear that decolonisation was imminent, Nkrumah assumed much more direct 
responsibility for the management of football. This ensured that the game featured 
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prominently in his aspirations to replace regional political chauvinism with a unifying sense 
of Ghanaianness and in his efforts to build wider pan-African solidarities. Thus, football was 
placed centre stage in the country’s independence celebrations, regional governing bodies 
were replaced with a single Ghanaian Amateur Football Association (GAFA) and a new 
national league, comprised of two teams from each of the four major municipalities was 
established.19 The strength of Nkrumah’s convictions regarding the contribution of football to 
his Africanist philosophies were such that in 1961 he established a multi-sport club himself, 
Real Republicans, who were charged with promoting pan-Africanism and ‘the new spirit of 
the African man’.20 This overt politicisation of the game was visibly etched into the football 
team’s shirts through the inscription of the initials ‘OOC’, which was shorthand for 
‘Osagyefo’s Own Club’, a reference to the appellation frequently applied to Nkrumah which 
roughly translated as ‘the victor in war’ or ‘redeemer’. 
Beyond the local scene, Ghana joined CAF and FIFA in 1957 and 1958 respectively 
and under the stewardship of Ohene Djan, the newly installed chairman of the GAFA and 
later first Director of Sports, international fixtures were quickly sought out. Reflecting 
Nkrumah’s pan-African agenda, these matches featured games against other newly 
independent African nations. The rationale behind this and his wider political agenda for 
sports was spelt out by Nkrumah in 1960; 
Not only can sports contribute towards the development of unity and understanding 
between the regions of Ghana, they have another even more important role to play in 
present day Africa. Through international competition with other African states, sports 
can provide that necessary basis of mutual understanding which can so greatly assist 
the realisation of our ideal of African unity.21 
 
In a move designed to further foster African brotherhood through football, the 
‘Kwame Nkrumah Gold Cup’ was initiated in 1960 with the first edition featuring Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone and, most significantly, Portuguese Guinea, then under Portuguese rule. With 
the ‘Black Stars’ increasingly cast in an ambassadorial role, exhibition games to celebrate the 
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independence of Kenya and Zambia followed as did matches in the Soviet Union, Germany, 
Austria, England, Spain and Italy which were organised to challenge prejudices about 
Africans in Europe.22 The biennial African Cup of Nations, inaugurated in 1957 soon became 
a focal point for the Ghanaian state’s efforts to showcase itself internationally, not least when 
it hosted the tournament in 1963. Spurred on by Nkrumah’s personal investment and interest, 
the hosts secured their first continental crown. In the following year, Ghana qualified for the 
Olympic football tournament and finished top of their group before losing in the quarter-
finals. 
While these successes were most welcome, the Ghanaian government had loftier 
ambitions for the Black Stars and it identified the World Cup as the platform towards which 
the national team should be aspiring. Indeed, in launching a three year ‘soccer development 
plan’ in 1960, Kojo Botsio, then chairman of the GAFA and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
declared ‘we are determined to be world soccer champions one day’.23 Three years later 
Botsio repeated this conviction, suggesting that the progress of African national teams was 
compelling their Latin American and European counterparts ‘to acknowledge the fact that the 
glory of African soccer is glittering the horizon’.24 Regardless of this rhetoric, there were few 
signs that FIFA was willing to translate this acknowledgement into access to the World Cup 
tournament. In this context, opportunities for Ghana, or other African nations to play on the 
game’s premier international stage and accrue the visibility and prestige that this would 
furnish remained extremely limited. Reflecting the political climate of the time, emboldened 
by decolonisation and in keeping with Nkrumah’s aspirations to use football to contribute to 
unity at home and promote his cherished pan-African principles, the response to this state of 




African Boycott and FIFA’s Response 
When FIFA revealed its intention not to allocate a guaranteed qualifying position to either 
Africa or Asia in January 1964, Ohene Djan, who had just been appointed to FIFA’s 
Executive Committee for a two-year term sent a telegram to FIFA’s Executive where he 
articulated his and indeed, CAF’s view;  
Registering strong objection to unfair World Cup arrangement for Afro-Asian 
countries STOP Afro-Asian countries struggling through painful expensive 
qualifying series for ultimate one finalist representation is pathetic and 
unsound STOP At the worst, Africa should have one finalist STOP Urgent – 
reconsider.25 
This initial response was followed up with a more detailed argument, prepared with his 
Ethiopian colleague Ydnekatchew Tessema, a founding member and later president of CAF, 
which invoked the principles of ‘fair play’ and ‘equity’ in their request for one place at the 
finals. CAF also warned of the likelihood that the African associations would not take part in 
the qualifying rounds given that the costs associated with organising a play-off between the 
winners of the African group and their counterparts from Asia and Oceania were onerously 
and prohibitively expensive.26  
While the logic of CAF’s argument did gain some traction among FIFA’s 
leadership,27 the absence of substantive change led to Djan, doubtless prompted by Nkrumah, 
tabling the idea of withdrawing from the qualifying rounds of the finals to CAF’s Executive 
Committee meeting in Cairo in July 1964. The response was unanimous and charged with 
‘making the World Championship a real world manifestation far from any exclusivism’, CAF 
informed FIFA of the intention of all African national associations to withdraw from World 
Cup qualifying.28 Djan who was instrumental in working out the finer details of the boycott 
strategy,29 articulated the rationale behind the boycott by invoking Nkrumah’s philosophy 
around the place of Africans in the post-colonial world; ‘We are not asking this as beggars. 
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We are putting forward just and moderate demands, taking account of the huge progress 
made in our football’.30 Galvanised by these sentiments, the Asian football confederation 
whose members were also denied realistic opportunities to qualify for the tournament soon 
followed Africa’s lead, arguing that ‘as a World Cup, the competition should represent the 
world and not just Europe and South America’.31 
Given its reluctance to countenance the opening up of its showcase competition in 
ways that would align with its self-professed internationalist vision for the game, FIFA’s 
decision to impose a fine of 5000 Swiss Francs in July 1965 on each of the national 
associations that had withdrawn from the competition was hardly surprising. This action not 
only placed a considerable financial burden on individual national football federations but 
also increased the antipathy of CAF’s constituents towards the world body. A reduction of 
the fine to 1000 Swiss Francs following the intervention of CAF, did little to abate the 
African nations’ enmity and they clamoured to publicly criticise FIFA’s position. For 
example, Mourad Fahmy, CAF’s General Secretary wrote to his counterpart in FIFA 
decrying what he called the ‘absurd’ allocation of one guaranteed berth for the World Cup 
finals to three continents comprising almost half of the world’s national Football 
Associations’.32 Ydnekatchew Tessema added to the criticism, arguing that;  
FIFA has adopted a relentless attitude against the African Associations and its 
decisions resemble methods of intimidation and repression designed to 
discourage any further impulses of a similar nature. In our opinion, the African 
National Associations which, in spite of the flagrant injustice that drove them 
to abandon the World Cup series, submitted sportingly to the regulations in 
force, so as to consolidate the moral authority of the FIFA, really deserved a 
gesture of respect rather than a fine.33 
 
The tenor of this discourse clearly reflected Nkrumah’s wider pan-African view that 
acting in unison, African nations were stronger politically. Indeed, according to the veteran 
Ghanaian journalist, Ebo Quansah, the unity shown by CAF ‘shook the very foundations of 
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FIFA’ and led directly to its decision, two years later, to grant the continent its own 
qualifying berth for the 1970 tournament.34 Somewhat ironically, Nkrumah was not in a 
position to continue to champion football or support the Black Stars pursuit of this berth. He 
had been ousted as president of Ghana in a military coup d’etat in February 1966 and with 
the removal of Djan from his position at the Ghanaian Sport Directorate in December, the 
two driving forces behind the boycott were no longer able to influence what became growing 
calls among African football federations for even greater representation at the World Cup. 
This is not to suggest that the consequences of the boycott were limited to the enhanced 
allocation of places for Africa and Asia at the 1970 World Cup. As the remainder of this 
article argues, the broad agenda that underpinned this strategy continued to percolate through 
FIFA’s political history. More specifically, it opened up space within the world body for the 
emergence of a patronage based form of governance that precipitated what was described as 
FIFA’s ‘crisis’ in 2015. 
 
Transforming the FIFA’s Governance 
While a guaranteed place for Africa at the 1970 World Cup was symbolically important, in 
quantitative terms, it did not significantly address the continental imbalances inherent in the 
world game. With Sir Stanley Rous at the helm of the world body, radical change was 
unlikely. While Rous had demonstrated modernist, progressive flourishes during his thirteen 
year tenure as FIFA president between 1961 and 1974, he was a firm believer that UEFA 
should maintain control over the game’s international development and he had adopted a 
paternalistic attitude to African football. For example, early in his presidency, he expressed 
concerns that the established European football nations ‘should have no more than equal 
voting rights with any of the newly created countries of Africa and Asia’.35 Similar views 
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were apparent in an interview that he conducted just prior to his death in 1986, when he 
described the initiation of football development programmes in Africa as part of FIFA’s 
‘general missionary work’.36 Furthermore, his support for the all-white Football Association 
of South Africa in the lead up to and long after their suspension from FIFA in 1964 not only 
ran counter to the pan-African sensibilities of CAF and irked their member federations but 
also demonstrated an inability to navigate the political realities of a volatile post-colonial 
world.37 Nonetheless, the experience and outcome of the boycott had emboldened CAF to 
continue to pursue their ambitions within FIFA and they soon recognised that fulfilment of 
their aspirations required a change in leadership at the head of the organisation. Galvanised 
by the 1966 boycott, and its outcome, CAF identified in the candidacy of the Brazilian 
business magnate, João Havelange, the strategy most likely to deliver this.  
 The story of Havelange’s rise to power at FIFA’s Frankfurt congress in 1974 is well-
trodden and does not require revisiting for this article.38 What is relevant for the discussion 
here is the fact that from an African perspective, this momentous event in FIFA’s and indeed, 
World Cup history was not only rooted in and driven by the same political sentiment that 
gave rise to the boycott but it also reflected the growing confidence of African nations to shed 
the strictures of European colonialism and assert themselves in the postcolonial world. As a 
shrewd observer of the political climate in world football at the time, Havelange made it clear 
during his three year canvassing campaign and through his election manifesto that he 
intended to set FIFA on a more internationalist path, one that would bring increased 
opportunities for its newer members. In return, they were happy to reciprocate with their 
votes. These votes were clearly the key in a result which signalled an unparalleled 
transformation in the affairs of FIFA as the balance of power shifted from the northern to the 
southern hemisphere. Rhamadan Ali, the former Tanzanian international player and eminent 
journalist, summarises this view well; 
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The balance of power was held by the AFC [CAF] bloc (with 37 votes). In the 
vote it became clear that the battle was between the old guard and the third 
world with Africa playing a decisive role…By ousting Sir Stanley, Africa and 
the rest of the third world have struck a resounding blow for a more equitable 
distribution of sporting power and influence in the world...it [CAF] has 
brought its influence to bear on a number of issues and has succeeded in 
breaking Europe’s monopoly of world football.39 
 
With the FIFA Presidency safely secured for a four-year period, Havelange immediately set 
about formulating the strategy that would enable him to fulfil the expensive promises he had 
made to the third world as part of his election strategy. To do so, the Brazilian needed to 
procure the necessary financial backing and with his marketing partner, Patrick Nally, he was 
able to broker major sponsorship deals with Adidas and Coca-Cola followed by the signing of 
lucrative, and what we now know to be ethically problematic, partnerships with transnational 
media partners, not least International Sport and Leisure (ISL).40 In a relatively short period, 
FIFA went from being an organisation with modest financial means to one awash with 
capital. Indeed, in noting his accomplishments as his 24 year tenure in office came to a 
conclusion, Havelange referenced the fact that FIFA’s financial reserves had been negligible 
when he came to power and exceeded $4 billion when he left.41 Once the Brazilian had 
successfully married the interests of FIFA, Adidas and Coca-Cola, he embarked on the 
practical realisation of his manifesto. A range of development programmes were established 
in Africa and Asia, two new world youth tournaments were inaugurated and hosted regularly 
by third world countries and steps were taken to increase the number of African and Asian 
nations taking part in the World Cup Finals. These developments on the field of play were 
matched by a gradual democratisation in FIFA’s committee structures which allowed Africa 
an enhanced say in the governance of world football. 
Whether the policy shift that Havelange instituted and his advocacy of a more 
globalist vision for FIFA was motivated by a genuine desire to enfranchise the world game’s 
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developing regions or was underpinned by an aspiration for power and the status and material 
trappings that came with the most senior administrative position in world football has long 
been debated and there is a consensus that the latter should read as the more accurate epitaph 
for the Brazilian.42 What is beyond question is the fact that his ascension to the presidency 
with the considerable assistance of African votes heralded in a period of radical 
transformation in how and for whom FIFA operated. Of course, as we now know, this 
transformation has also brought with it considerable issues in terms of governance. In 
particular, it introduced a set of dynamics that shaped FIFA politics for decades to come, 
positioned Africa as a key constituency around which these dynamics cohered and entrenched 
a patron-client based form of governance at the heart of the organisation that was frequently 
characterised by corruption and unethical financial practices. These processes coalesced and 
became particularly visible during a number of election campaigns for the FIFA Presidency. 
This was perhaps most apparent when the Swede, Lennart Johansson, then head of the 
European football confederation (UEFA), took the decision in 2015 to run against Havelange 
in the 1998 election. A brief overview of this campaign is useful by way of illustration.  
When he announced his candidature to run against Havelange in 1995, Johansson 
quickly recognised the importance of brokering better relations with FIFA’s sizeable African 
constituency if his campaign was to be successful. His approach in this regard was embodied 
in a set of proposals aimed at revolutionising the organisational, political and financial base 
of world football and radically altering UEFA’s approach to other continental confederations. 
Indeed, in articulating the rhetoric behind the initiative, UEFA suggested that it now 
‘recognised the progress of all the continental confederations and considered them as equal 
partners, who should be appropriately involved in FIFA matters’.43 The central objective of 
the proposals was to incorporate and involve the confederations, in a more pivotal manner, in 
the administration of international football. For example, Vision I proposed a system of 
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rotation around the confederations for the hosting of World Cup finals as well as the FIFA 
Presidency whilst Vision II was directed at ensuring that national associations would, for the 
first time, have a direct share of revenues generated by the World Cup Finals.44 Alongside the 
Vision proposals, Johansson also put in place an accord between CAF and UEFA, the 
Meridian Project, which provided financial, technical and technological aid to selected 
African football associations.45 
While these efforts in brokering this new relationship with African football were 
reflective of the Swedish social democratic, welfarist and internationalist values that 
Johansson had been steeped in as part of his upbringing, they were also rooted in political 
expediency and a belated recognition from UEFA that winning back the presidency required 
a transformation in the sort of attitudes that had led to the African boycott of the 1966 World 
Cup and Havelange’s subsequent election in 1974.46 Havelange’s decision not to continue 
with his candidacy only a matter of months before the vote, following a series of political 
mishaps and miscalculations, appeared to give Johansson a clear run at the presidency. 
However, three months prior to the election, Sepp Blatter, FIFA’s former General Secretary 
and long-time Havelange confidant, entered the election fray. Despite the fact that Blatter had 
yet to formally announce his candidature, Havelange began to canvass vigorously on behalf 
of his close ally. In particular, the Brazilian focused on FIFA’s developing constituencies and 
his forceful and politically shrewd electioneering in Africa presented major problems for 
Johansson’s campaign strategy and his alliance with CAF. The difficulty with attempting to 
procure unanimous African support was, of course, that any candidate backed by the 
outgoing President would appeal strongly to the many African national associations which 
had benefited from the Brazilian’s development initiatives and patronage during his twenty-
four years in office.  
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Alongside the Brazilian’s lobbying efforts, Blatter presented himself as an advocate of 
African football and his increasingly vociferous support of South Africa’s bid to host the 
2006 World Cup was crucial in this respect. Significantly, Blatter’s support for Africa in the 
build up to the Presidential poll went beyond political rhetoric. Almost directly paralleling 
Havelange’s canvassing efforts in Africa prior to securing the presidency in 1974, he 
concentrated his electioneering in this constituency. Two weeks before the election, a clearer 
picture of likely voting trends had emerged and this indicated that the candidate who could 
curry most favour with the forty-four African nations eligible to participate in the 
proceedings of the Paris Congress would be the new FIFA President.47 As events transpired, a 
late change of allegiance within the African bloc, precipitated by offers of financial assistance 
from Blatter, ultimately gifted the Swiss the FIFA presidency.48 As was the case in 1974, this 
election, and Africa’s importance in determining the outcome, further entrenched the patron-
client bonds that had come to characterise and determine FIFA’s governance and policy 
direction. Furthermore, while it was never established whether Blatter had acted unethically 
in offering financial support to voting associations prior to the election, the US Department of 
Justice (DoJ) indictment of a number of high ranking FIFA officials in May 2015, tends to 
support the view that the outcome of the election was underpinned by the corrupt practices 
and malign culture that have long festered at the centre of the world body.49 
 
Conclusion 
Irrespective of one’s view of the individuals who led FIFA’s post-1974 transformation, the 
world body became much more outward looking and football’s emerging regions were better 
supported. While it can be argued that the support of a Brazilian for these regions reflected 
Latin America’s leadership of the wider non-aligned movement that had acquired particular 
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prominence by the mid-1970s, the alliances that were nurtured in the lead up to the election 
and beyond were also rooted in political expediency and underpinned by Havelange’s 
personal ambitions.50 The significance of this is that it opened up space for the emergence of 
an explicitly patronage based form of governance within FIFA. As this article has shown, the 
African boycott of the 1966 World Cup was significant in this regard because it had clearly 
highlighted to Havelange the political value of both deploying the rhetoric of 
enfranchisement and acting on it as a way of securing and retaining the presidency. Sepp 
Blatter’s presidency further entrenched these patron-client bonds and ensured that FIFA’s key 
policy decisions reflected the aspirations of FIFA’s emerging regions. However, rather than 
be celebrated as a laudable outworking of what were justifiable and entirely appropriate 
demands around the 1966 World Cup, this patron-client form of governance frequently 
lapsed into cronyism, nepotism and corruption, processes that ultimately led to FIFA’s 
‘crisis’ in 2015.  
In launching its post ‘crisis’ reforms in October 2016, the new FIFA President, Gianni 
Infantino, who had been elected nine months previously, set out a ‘roadmap’, the ‘FIFA 2.0 
Vision for the Future’, that he claimed would make the world body a more transparent, open 
and democratic organisation. At the same time, he pledged to introduce new governance 
arrangements and oversight mechanisms that would tackle the financial corruption that the 
DoJ and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indictment had revealed to be endemic and 
institutionalised within the world body.51 While there are some promising signs as this reform 
process, overseen by the DoJ and FBI, has taken hold and as FIFA has begun to stride out on 
this ‘new’ policy and governance direction, only time will reveal whether and how the world 
body will differ from its pre-2015 incarnation. What is clear however, is that the events and 
sentiments that led to the African boycott of the 1966 World Cup still echo in FIFA’s 
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corridors of power, and more specifically, continue to impact the world game’s showcase 
event.  
As noted earlier, the most immediate ramification of the boycott was the granting of 
automatic qualifying berths for the 1970 tournament to African and Asia. By 1982, the 
competition had been enlarged to 24 teams and it was increased in size to 32 from 1998 
onwards. These decisions were partly motivated by a desire to better accommodate 
previously disenfranchised constituencies at the World Cup and enabled Havelange not only 
to retain his seat at the helm of world football but to decisively influence Sepp Blatter’s 
succession at the Paris Congress in 1998. For all its emphasis on reform, the ‘FIFA 2.0’ 
vision can also be viewed in policy terms as contiguous with the past and there are 
similarities with the expansionist and democratising rhetoric employed by Havelange and 
Infantino. Infantino’s role in shaping the world body’s ‘new’ vision may reflect nothing other 
than a desire to expand the reach (and finances) of the organisation that he leads. However, 
FIFA’s post-Rous history suggests that an awareness of how such a philosophy might 
resonate with important voting blocs is never too far away from the thoughts of those with 
ambitions in sports governance. Indeed, the Infantino led decision to enlarge the World Cup 
to 48 teams from 2026 can be interpreted as being underscored by the same realpolitik that 
marked the previous expansion of the competition. In justifying his proposal, and no doubt 
well aware of how his justification would play out in FIFA’s African constituency, Infantino 
unwittingly harked back to the same principles that underpinned the 1966 boycott;  
Football is more than just Europe and South America, football is global…Football 
promotion, in many parts of the world where today they have no chance to play [at the 
World Cup] was at the top of our thoughts.52 
 
The fact that a European FIFA president, some fifty years after the boycott of the 
1966 finals, invoked the same sort of rhetoric employed by Nkrumah, Djan, Tessema and 
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others is perhaps the clearest indication of the enduring legacy of this momentous event in 
football history.  
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